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I want to begin this discussion with some personal and political
observations. When I was in college, I considered myself a liberal.
Accordingly, I was anti-business, pro-labor and in favor of govern-
ment intervention in the economy, if not outright nationalization
of essential industries for the public good. Of course, I was also
all for civil liberties and civil rights, and I perceived no conflict
between the goal of government control of business and the goal
of freedom for individuals from government control.
No doubt my political views were influenced by my inability
to picture myself as a union-worker, a member oc management
or a government employee. Life after college was a blank. As it
turned out, I filled in the blank post-college space in my life by
making the decision each of you have made and going to law
school.
In law school, my vague belief in civil liberties began to assume
the form of legal principles. I grappled with the concepts of due
process and federal jurisdiction. I visited a local women's house
of detention with my criminal law class and my notion of criminal
justice became less philosophical and more rooted in the treat-
ment by government of people like me.
I was at that time inspired by the idea of John F. Kennedy's
New Frontier, and I was prepared to give my support to a man
who asked the American people to choose the public interest over
private comfort. Although I still had trouble picturing myself as
part of either the business or government establishments, the
working world began to come into clearer focus. Upon graduation
I became a government lawyer. I chose public service because it
better comported with my idealistic notions about the legal pro-
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fessions than did private practice. There were also better oppor-
tunities for women in a government agency than in a law firm.
The agency I chose was the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), which is an independent regulatory agency of the fed-
eral government, charged with investor protection and the pro-
motion of fair and equitable trading markets.
As a prosecutor of securities fraud cases, I believed I was vindi-
cating the public interest. When I went to court representing my
client, the U.S. Government, I took it for granted that truth and
justice were on my side. I was, in fact, one small cog in our federal
system of criminal justice. My daily contact with that system
transformed it, in my mind's eye, from a neo-classic temple where
god like creatures dispensed justice to a dingy government build-
ing where faceless bureaucrats coped as well as they could with a
faceless horde of miscreants.
I had frequent contact with white collar criminals. Some of
them struck me as decent and engaging. And I also had frequent
contact with defrauded investors. Some of them struck me as
victims of their own greed as much as the greed of those who had
defrauded them. I also spoke with men who were under indict-
ment or even in jail as the result of my efforts. These contacts,
and their combination, began to give me nagging doubts about
the value of my work to society in general. I sometimes had trou-
ble reconciling the cases on which I was working with such grandi-
ose concepts as vindication of the law or the vitality of the capital
markets.
I gave little consideration to what I might do next in life. It
rarely occurred to me that later I might become a corporate and
securities lawyer for a law firm, and represent large public corpor-
ations and regulated businesses in the securities industry. I could
imagine myself teaching law students, but a law school professor
seemed an occupation for someone older and wiser - a real grown
up. It certainly never occured to me that I might one day be a
Commissioner at the SEC.
The events of my life and in the political arena, however, were
fast moving and unexpected. Less than 10 years after I left the
SEC staff I returned as one of the commissioners heading the
agency. I was a public figure, a Carter appointee. My ambiva-
lence about government power had only been exacerbated by my
personal experiences as a private practitioner, and by the history
of the Nixon Administration. It is this ambivalance in particular
that I want to discuss. I believe that Americans, and particularly
liberals, are undergoing a profound rethinking of how to resolve
the tension between the need to use government power for the
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general welfare and the need to curtail that power, both because
of economic and political concerns, and the fear of abuse of undue
power. This rethinking is having a particularly significant impact
on regulatory agencies like the SEC.
Before I launch more deeply into this subject, I think it would
be instructive for me to explain what the SEC does and how it is
organized. The SEC was created in 1934 as an independent fed-
eral regulatory agency.' It is a collegial body composed of 5 com-
missioners, with staggered 5 year terms, one of whom is desig-
nated Chairman. The majority of the Commissioners are of the
President's political party.
The work of the SEC is investigative, prosecutorial, legislative
and adjudicatory. The agency's work is conducted to a large ex-
tent by the staff of its operating divisions and offices. However,
all official Commission action must be approved by a vote of the
members of the Commission.
There are a number of different statutes which comprise the
federal securities laws which the Commission administers.' But
the greatest part of the work is concerned with the Securities Act
of 19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
The 1933 Act generally requires that corporations file registra-
tion statements with the SEC covering offerings of their securities
to the public. Such statements include information about the
business and affairs of the issuer, including certified financial
statements. The 1934 Act imposes continuous disclosure require-
ments on public companies and in addition, regulates the trading
of securities in the public securities markets.
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are products of the Great Depression. They were enacted at
a time when the stock market and the national economy were-at
their lowest ebb. The federal securities laws are premised on the
theory that when a corporation seeks funds from the public it
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §4, 48 Stat. 885 (1934) (current
versions at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976)).
1 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§1-26, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, ch. 404, §§ 1-34, 48 Stat. 885 (1934); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, §§ 1-33, 49 Stat. 803 (1935); Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, ch. 411, §§ 301-328, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939); Investment Company Act of
1940, ch. 686, §§ 1-53, 54 Stat. 789 (1940); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch.
686, §§ 201-221, 54 Stat. 847 (1940); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
Pub.L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
3 Ch. 38, §§ 1-26, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb
(1976)).
Ch. 404, §§1-34, 48 Stat. 885 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk
(1976)).
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becomes a public body and its managers and bankers become
public functionaries. Legal protections are given to investors and
shareholders as an incentive to buy securities.
At the time the federal securities laws were passed there was
considerable debate as to whether they should compel full disclo-
sure or whether the SEC should be given authority to regulate the
business of public corporations. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the Congress which enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts opted for
publicity and information as the best federal policy for protecting
investors, the debate between advocates of disclosure, like Felix
Frankfurter,' and advocates of regulation, like William 0. Doug-
las,6 continues to the present time.
President Roosevelt's message to Congress recommending the
passage of the 1933 Act emphasized that the purpose of the legis-
lation was "to protect the public with the least possible interfer-
ence to honest business."7 There were many who doubted the
value of the free enterprise system and who would have estab-
lished governmental control not only of the manner in which
securities could be issued but also of the very right of any enter-
prise to tap the capital market. President Roosevelt and the Con-
gress, however, rejected demands for such direct federal regula-
tion of public corporations.
In general, the securities laws do not federalize state corpora-
tion law, and the SEC has not attempted to regulate corporate
conduct as such. Further, the Commission traditionally has re-
lied upon such regulatory techniques as disclosure, competition
and self-regulation, rather than the more common techniques of
licensing, rate-making and standard setting. I believe that part
of the SEC's reputation as an outstanding agency has been due
to its limited regulatory mandate.
Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a clamor reminis-
cent of the 1930's urging that the federal government in general,
5 See L. BAKER, FELIx FRANKFURTER 159 (1969). Felix Frankfurter "defended
the [Securities Act] publicly in the August, 1933, Fortune: '. . . The Securities
Act. . . proceeds on the principle that when a corporation seeks funds from the
public, it becomes in every true sense a public corporation. Its affairs cease to
be the private prerequisite of its bankers and managers' .. "
I Id. at 160. In 1933 William 0. Douglas, then a professor of law at Yale, felt
that the Securities Act of 1933 did not go far enough. He argued that it was of
secondary importance in a program of social control over finance, and that
merely to tell the truth "did not offer enough protection against skullduggery."
Id.
I Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Senate (March 29,
1933), 73 CONG. REc. 937 (1933); Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to the House (March 29, 1933), id. at 954.
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and the SEC in particular, exercise greater direct control over
corporate conduct. Beginning in 1973, as a result of the work of
the Offfice of the Watergate Special Prosecutor, the SEC became
aware of a pattern of conduct involving the use of corporate funds
for illegal domestic political contributions. Subsequent Commis-
sion investigations revealed that instances of undisclosed ques-
tionable or illegal corporate payments-both domestic and for-
eign-were widespread, and over 400 public companies made con-
fessions of such payments to the Commission.
As a result of these disclosures, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act8 was passed in December 1977. This statute is an amendment
to the securities laws and requires public corporations to make
and keep accurate books and records and to devise and maintain
a system of internal accounting controls. The SEC thus has a new
potential for directly regulating the internal workings of corpora-
tions. How the Commission will implement its powers under this
new statute remains to be seen.
Some critics believe that the SEC should be given much more
regulatory power over corporations. Last year the Commission
held public hearings on the subject of shareholder communica-
tions, shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process
and corporate governance." One of the witnesses in those hearings
was Ralph Nader, who characterized the disclosures of question-
able or illegal payments made by corporations to the SEC as a
"corporate crime epidemic"' 0 and advocated as an antidote a
federal chartering statute for giant corporations. Other witnes-
ses, including professor William Cary and Senator Howard M.
Metzenbaum, rejected the idea of federal chartering, but argued
for remedial legislation in the form of a minimum standards act.
*The premise of such proposed legislation is that the government
should harness corporate power for the benefit of the general pub-
lic. The thrust of such legislation would therefore be much
broader than the SEC's traditional concern for investors and
shareholders.
At the same time as some political groups are urging greater
federal control of corporate conduct, others are urging a lessening
of federal intervention under the banner of deregulation. Al-
8 Pub.L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (enacting §§ 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 and
amending §§ 78m(b) and 78ff of 15 U.S.C.).
I See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15384 (Dec. 6, 1978).
10 Statement of Ralph Nader, Official Transcript of Proceedings before the
Securities and Exchange Commission In the Matter of Public Hearings on
Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in Corporate Elec-
toral Process and Corporate Governance, File No. 87-693, page 205, September
30, 1977.
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though the idea of deregulation is not new, regulatory reform has
become one of the slogans of the Carter administration.
I believe that the appeal of deregulation is related to the chang-
ing public perception of government's role in our society. As pro-
fessor Geoffery Hazard of the Yale Law School notes:
We are in an age of diminshed reform expectations and greater
skepticism about the uses of government intervention."
The Carter presidency, unlike prior Democratic administrations
of my lifetime, has not adopted a utopia-invoking slogan - such
as New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, or Great Society. Indeed,
President Carter's recent State of the Union message suggested
that America seek a "New Foundation" where the limitations of
government would be recognized."
The reasons for changing public attitude concerning govern-
mental regulation are varied and complex. The economic and
social policies of the New Deal which dominated the government
for four decades were to some extent based on the psychology of
the Great Depression. Expectations last raised in the call for a
Great Society of the 1960's were left unsatisfied to create a legacy
of disappointed idealism. The failure of these social programs,
despite the money, efforts and energies invested, led to a skepti-
cism about the government's ability to achieve even popularly
acclaimed goals. The financial collapse of New York City raised
serious questions about how economic and social programs can be
financed.
Although we are in a period of economic difficulty, the axioms
of the Great Depression do not necessarily provide solutions for
these inflationary times. The Depression was perceived as socially
unjust because there was such widespread poverty and unem-
ployment in a land of unlimited opportunity. In Roosevelt's era,
the cause of the economic crisis was perceived to be business, and
government regulation was seen as a way to readjust unfair distri-
butions of wealth.
In contrast, today the problem is inflation, which is also per-
ceived as socially unjust because the incomes, goods and services
of a limited economy are not being fairly distributed. But govern-
ment regulation is considered part of the problem rather than an
obvious solution. As the Commission's Chairman, Harold M.
Williams, recently analyzed:
1 Falk, A Suit Over the Loss of Private Pension Benefits Is One Issue Before
Supreme Court in New Term, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 48, col 1.
12 Text of the President's State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of
Congress, N.Y.Times, Jan. 24, 1978, at A13, col. 1.
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Inflation - widely characterized as our most pressing problem -
is primarily a political phenomenon. At bottom, its cause is the
failure of our political system to contain the growth of social de-
mands within limits tolerable to the market."3
Another reason why many liberals are questioning the value of
government regulation is that we witnessed such serious abuses
of government power before and during the Watergate era. The
conflict between the ideals of the welfare state and individual
liberties becomes more apparent.
Much regulatory legislation is intended to provide the public,
and especially consumers, with protection against perceived ills.
I believe that we must begin to reassess not only the efficacy of
that protection, but also whether the economic, legal and social
burdens of maintaining this legislative insurance are worth such
protection. All regulation is costly, not only because it is paid for
by taxation, but also because it interferes with market forces,
increases the size and complexity of government, and favors one
group of people in our society over another. In many instances the
favored group needs special consideration or protection. But
often, the claims of the protected are no better that the claims of
the regulated. Furthermore, the protected and the regulated may
turn out to have a certain mutuality of identity so that the pri-
mary beneficiaries of a regulatory scheme are the regulators.
This means that even an acceptance of the theory that regula-
tion is a major contributor to inflation will not necessarily result
in any dismantling of the regulatory apparatus. The federal bu-
reaucracy itself is a powerful special interest group because it
depends upon and benefits many other influential interests.
Every federal regulatory system has a political constituency.
One example which illustrates what I have been discussing is
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." Although Congress passed
that statute in specific response to the problem of the bribery of
foreign officials by American companies operating abroad, it
vastly increased the S.E.C.'s regulatory powers over the'internal
accounting affairs of public corporations. If the end result of that
statute is greatly to improve the record keeping and accounting
controls of American corporations for the ultimate benefit of the
general economy, the legislation will be all to the good. If, how-
ever, implementation of the statute primarily benefits govenment
regulators and the accounting profession by giving them more
"a Address by Harold M. Williams at the Columbia University/McGraw-Hill
Lectures in Business and Society, New York, N.Y. (Sept. 26, 1978).
" Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
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work to do without at the same time serving the larger public
interest, this legislation may not prove worthwhile.
At the present time I am a public official - a federal regulator.
By profession, however I am an atttorney, and I have devoted
most of my career to the practice of securities law, a specialty
which would not exist without the SEC. A recent commission of
the American Bar Association, notes the role of the legal profes-
sion in the regulatory process as followws:
Lawyers have been major participants in the development and oper-
ation of our present system of government regulation. . . . The legal
profession thus shares responsibility for the better functioning of the
regulatory system. This is especially true in the face of strong indica-
tions that the regulatory apparatus is not working well but is con-
tinuing to expand."
As a lawyer, I am deeply distressed about what sometimes
looks like an alliance between the regulatory agencies and the
regulated industries for the benefit of the legal profession instead
of the public. I do not believe this alliance is the result of malevol-
ence or conspiracy. Rather, it is an unfortunate fall out of too
much government regulation by an overly legalistic society.
As lawyers and law students I hope that you are likewise con-
cerned about the regulatory process and that you will be active
participants in the political process which will determine whether
our independent regulatory agencies will become more or less
powerful in the future. I have discussed my own ambivalence
about the regulatory process, as well as what I perceive as coun-
tervailing political forces at work today with respect to regula-
tion. At least one commentator, Professor James 0. Freedman,
has suggested that American, ambivalence toward the indepen-
dent regulatory agencies is endemic because they have been un
able to persuade the public of their authentic governmental char-
acter."
Professor Freedman theorizes that one reason for this failure of
legitimacy is the great reverence Americans have for the doctrine
of separation of powers." The combination of powers in adminis-
trative agencies is therefore suspect. Further, Americans have
failed to develop or agree upon a coherent philosophy of gove.n-
mental activism in economic matters. He states:
"5 ABA COMM. ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, Federal Regulation: Roads to
Reform 10-11 (Exposure Draft, Aug. 5, 1978).
16 Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 10-1, 1045 (1975).
'1 Id. at 1046.
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The nearest approach our society has made to achieving such a
philosophy has been to secure general agreement for the proposition
that the appropriate extent of governmental activism in planning
and controlling the economy lies somewhere between the polarities
defined by Adam Smith and Karl Marx ...
Administrative agencies, as the symbols of our belief that some
degree of governmental regulation of the economy is necessary and
appropriate, inevitably become a focal point in that debate. The
imprecision of the ideology that justifies the existence of administra-
tive agencies reflects the basic ambivalence of our society toward the
process of regulation."
My own thinking is still evolving concerning the proper balance
between government intervention in the economy and freedom
from government interference. Too often, we think of ourselves as
consumers in need of protection, rather than producers who are
being subjected to regulation. As William 0. Douglas, an early
SEC Chairman, stated in a late opinion while he was a Supreme
Court Justice:
The bureaucracy of modern government is not only slow, lumbering
and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It touches everyone's life at nu-
merous points. It pries more and more into private affairs, breaking
down the barriers that individuals erect to give them some insula-
tion from the intrigues and harassments of modern life."
I would heed these words in striking the proper balance be-
tween government power and administrative restraint.
, Id. at 1053-54.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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